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Abstract
Under what condition states will withdraw from an international organization?
This article examines this question from the perspective of three systemic
approaches: realism, liberalism, and constructivism by generating hypotheses
from each approach and testing them on the case of Indonesia s withdrawal
from the United Nations in 1965. The systemic perspectives, however, could
only provide partial answers to this puzzle, and thus the need to include
domestic political analysis in conjunction of the systemic analysis in order to
fully answer the question.
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Introduction
Under what condition states will withdraw from an international
organization? While there are abundant literature  on cooperation between
states, why states decide to build international institutions, and tout the benefits
of regimes in international relations, there are very few discussions on when
state will withdraw from international regimes, because in general, the
withdrawal itself is seen as unthinkable. Take the example of “Brexit,” the
decision by the British voters in a referendum to leave the European Union,
which caught the political and business elite all over the world off guard, was
often characterized as “unthinkable.” It is “unthinkable” that anyone would
leave an international organization, due to economic and other benefits that the
international organization, in this case, the European Union, provided, and the
uncertainties that will result (The Economist: 2016).
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Yet, as “Brexit” shows, states do leave international organizations. This
paper is trying to answer a puzzle in international organization theory: under
what condition state thinks that international regimes no longer fit its interests
and thus it will withdraw from international organization? In order to do so, it
will be instructive to discuss the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United
Nations.
The United Nations is an organization that emerges from the ashes of
the Second World War with main purpose of maintaining global security and
peace. By fostering cooperation in many aspects between nations, it is hoped
that such cooperation will create more trust among nations, and that, in turn,
lead to peace. Since major  strands of  the field of  international relations
basically in agreement that state is security maximizer and the United Nations
itself as an entity is beneficial for national interest (Morgenthau: 1965), then
withdrawing from the United Nations is supposedly unthinkable since the
withdrawal will increase the insecurity especially for that particular state, not to
mention giving up many benefits from being in the United Nations itself. Yet
in January 1965 Indonesia decided to withdraw from the United Nations.
In order to answer this puzzle, first I will discuss some of the literatures
from realism, institutionalism, and constructivism that deal with international
organizations as my basic assumptions of the   nature of   international
institutions. From these basic assumptions I will generate hypothesis that under
what condition state will withdraw from international regimes. Second, I will
test the hypotheses in case studies on Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN.
Thirdly,  I will evaluate the hypotheses of these perspectives and from the
evaluation I will try to generate a new model that will try to fill the gap in the
literature.
Literature
The debate in international relations regarding the necessity of
international regimes is overall settled, as all sides in the debates essentially
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agree that international organizations do matters, important, and desirable,
although each side has its own distinct argument. Neorealists such as Stephen
Krasner argues that international regimes help hegemonic state to regulate the
international system for its own advantages, while for smaller states,
international regimes is also economically and politically beneficial as by
joining international regimes smaller states are receiving the collective goods
provided by the hegemon (Krasner, 1976).
Institutionalists such as Robert Keohane argues that international
regimes are important for states in order to facilitate cooperation by reducing
transaction costs that states have to pay in signing into agreements through
providing  information and rules that reduce incentives to cheat (Keohane:
1984). In fact, the function of regimes as information providers to its members
is its most important function, since by fully informing member states, regimes
will reduce uncertainties and thus reducing the risk of the state of engaging in
potentially costly agreements  (Hopf, 1998:  23) Since states can engage in
mutually beneficial agreements with others without facing the risk of being
deceived, then states will keep pursuing policy of cooperation.
Constructivists discuss international regimes through the  lens  of
identity. Hopf argues that the distribution of identities and interests of the states
determine states' willingness to cooperate. The reason is that identity subsumes
reputation and  identity can provide states  necessary diagnostic information
about what actions other states will take and thus providing some certainties in
anarchical situation (Hopf: 1998: 189). As the result of the shared identity then
states might see themselves as partners in pursuit of common interests and
willing to cooperate. An example of this approach is Finnemore's arguments
that international regimes can help spreading norms by persuading states to
adopt beneficial changes through mutually beneficial interactions: for the
stronger states, international organization can help spreading their values
(norms) of scientific community to weaker state (in Finnemore's example: a
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Marshall Plan for ideas) while for weaker states, adapting the norm can help
them emulate into strong and modern scientific state (science as a national
pursuit), (Finnemore: 1993: 566). Thus international organization is enabling
states to share each other identity and strengthen the bonds between states.
When we look further beyond these arguments, we can find some
important commonalities between these perspectives, which lie on their
assumptions of the main purposes of international regime. Some of the most
important functions of international organizations (regimes) are to provide
publik goods such as economic benefits (trade organizations) and to help
reducing uncertainties in the anarchical world system by minimizing the
possibilities of cheating by using rules that have to be observed by states and
by providing better information. Yet, these approaches take different paths in
their predictions on when the regime finally collapses or when states finally
decide to abandon the international regime.
Neorealists, such as John Mearsheimer by assuming that international
organization is as a function of great powers, argues that international
(Mearsheime, 2000: 339) organization will collapse once it no longer suits the
existing balance of power and when the hegemon that provides the security
guarantee among member states withdraw (Mearsheime, 2000:45). While
Mearsheimer assumes that institutions will simply disappear, Krasner injects
the "stickiness of institution"  variable, where he argues that regimes will
remain until a critical event forces states to finally dismantle the regime
(Krasneg, 1976:341). Joseph M. Grieco (1983: 184), working from the state-
level analysis, proposes that state will leave international organization
(cooperative arrangement) when it realizes that other states can have greater
gains from the cooperation and potentially able to even surpass the state. From
all these realists' perspectives, then we can create a realist's hypothesis, which
is state will withdraw from international organization once it believes  the
organization no longer suit its interests and even compromising its power
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relationship vis-à-vis other states and only a withdrawal by an important
hegemon (great power) from the organization that can cause the collapse of
the international organization.
Neoliberals/functionalists such as Keohane on the other hand argues
that regimes will not be dismantled simply because state no longer believe the
international organization can suit its interests or when the hegemon no longer
able to prop the regimes (due to decline). The basis for this argument is that
setting up a new regime is very expensive, due to high transaction costs and
uncertainties in interactions between states (the sunk cost in creating the
regime), (Keohane, 1984:100). Since the old regime has already been able to
reduce the transaction cost and uncertainties in the first place, then abandoning
it means state has to pay those high costs again if the state want to set up a new
one to replace the old regime. As the result, instead of abandoning existing
regimes, states will try to modify the existing regimes in order to suit the
present need and thus in Keohane's words, "regimes tend to evolve rather than
to die" and sympathized governments will have every incentive to maintain the
regimes regardless the cost to their self-interests.
However, Keohane's argument is also problematic when we see that
states do withdraw and abandon international organizations. There are cases
where international organizations are simply abandoned by states such as the
League of Nations, where the organization was simply abandoned after the
outbreak of the Second World War, until it was replaced later by the United
Nations. Shanks et al. try to answer this  puzzle using the combination  of
functionalist-organizational ecology argument argue that states may withdraw
from international institutions when they find the cost of maintaining the
membership in the international institution is too high to bear, and thus states
have to streamline their membership in international organization (e.g. by
withdrawing from organizations which functions can be served by other larger
(worldwide compared to regional) and established organizations (Shank et. al.
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2001: 168). So, Shanks et al.' argument is essentially  the other side of
Keohane's coin, that governments who have no sympathize toward the current
regime will have no incentives to maintain it, especially when they see
international regimes are not helping them in reducing their transaction costs
(e.g. due to defections). Still, Shanks et al. add another caveat to the
functionalist argument using the organizational ecology that generalized
organizations will have higher rate of survival due to its flexibility, as they will
be able to adapt to new demands.
From these perspectives then we can generate our neoliberal/
functionalist hypothesis that a state' position toward international regimes is
based  on how beneficial the regimes are toward reducing the state's
transaction costs and how flexible the regimes are. If a state finds the
international regimes non-beneficial, then  the state  will try to reform the
regime if the state still shares common interests with the regime and if the
regimes themselves are flexible enough that allow changes to take place.
Otherwise, the state will abandon international regimes.
Constructivists see international regimes as a part of identity building,
as international regimes help enabling  states to understand each other as
partners in common enterprise. As the result, institution will persist due to the
shared identity among states concerned with this institution (Hopf, 1998: 191).
Stretching this argument further, then we can also argue that state will not have
much incentives to cooperate with other  states, whom the state find no
common identity since the uncertainties are too high a cost for the state to bear.
From  this argument  then we can  deduce the constructivist hypothesis  that
states will not join (or will leave) international institution if states do not think
that it can find neither common identity nor the desire to build a common
identity in the international institution.
Having discussed these literatures, then we can proceed to test these
hypotheses into our case study, which is Indonesia's withdrawal from the
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United Nations in 1965. Since all these hypotheses are "systemic level types,"
this case study would not take domestic policy into consideration until the
second part when I would build a new model that account for domestic policy.
Case Study: Indonesia: "The Year of Living Dangerously" (1963-5)
On the New Year Eve 1965, President Sukarno announced Indonesia's
withdrawal from the United Nations. This action is very surprising, considering
that this is the only case in the history of the United Nations that a state
completely withdrew from that organization. In his announcement on
Indonesia's withdrawal from the  United  Nations, Sukarno attributed his
decision to his displeasure that Malaysia was about to take a seat on the United
Nations Security Council (Mackie, 1974: 279).
Sukarno's animosity toward  Malaysia, especially its prime  minister,
Tunku Abdul Rahman, was dated from 1958, when then-Malaya was believed
to support separatist rebellions in Indonesia, notably  the PRRI/Permesta
(Legge, 1984: 363). In addition, Sukarno himself thought very lowly on
Malaysia, claiming that Malaysia was never independent, but a puppet of the
British in order to spread the British influence in Southeast Asia (Subritzky,
2000: 42). However, when the idea of Malaysia was flouted in 1961, Indonesia
did not raise any objection due to its preoccupation with the issue of West
Irian, as Indonesia at that time was embroiled in military and diplomatic "war"
with the Dutch (Mackie, 1974: 103).
Things  started to change by the end of 1962, when Indonesia was
finally able to settle the question of West Irian. The year would be uneventful
for the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, had there not been a
rebellion in Brunei against the incorporation of Northern Kalimantan states
(Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak) to the Federation of Malaysia on December 8,
1962. While the revolt was quickly suppressed, Indonesia pointed at this as an
evidence of the unwillingness of people of North Kalimantan to be
28
Jurnal Academia Praja Volume 1 Nomor 1 - Februari 2018
incorporated into the British puppet state of Malaysia. Ill-chosen statements
from Kuala Lumpur that blamed Jakarta that followed this rebellion further
exacerbated the situations, as it stroked the nationalistic fervor that culminated
on January 20, 1963, with Subandrio, Indonesian Foreign Minister, declared
the policy of "Konfrontasi" against Malaysia, where Indonesia would
"confront" Malaysia militarily and diplomatically.
At this point, however, Indonesia's economy was in shambles. Its policy
of "regain West Irian" was very costly and thus it needed a face-saving
arrangement to cease the policy of Konfrontasi. On 31 May and 1 June 1963,
Sukarno met privately with the Tunku in Tokyo and they ended up issuing a
joint communiqué stating that both governments would "refrain from making
acrimonious attacks and disparaging references to each other" – thus ending
Konfrontasi, and would resolve their differences "in a spirit of friendliness and
goodwill." Apparently, Sukarno was friendly with the Tunku and resigned to
the establishment of the federation. The Tunku was so pleased that he felt
Sukarno "had clearly called off his confrontation without having had to be
given anything in return (Jones, 2002: 157).
What was needed at this point was a face-saving formula that would
allow Sukarno to call off confrontation and a plebiscite would be a good way to
do so. Moreover, Indonesia was convinced that the people of Northern
Kalimantan were actually  unwilling to join the Malaysian Federation, as
evident in the Brunei Rebellion. Thus, by pushing the issue of self-
determination, Indonesia hoped that it could force both the British and the
Malaya to give it a significant concession,   or at least a face-saving
arrangement, to cease the policy of confrontation (Mackie, 1974: 156). In order
to do that, on June 11, 1963, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya, and
the Philippines met in Manila to hammer the details and later, Sukarno, Tunku,
and the Philippines President Diosdado Macapagal met in the Manila Summit
that would take place from July 30 to August 5, 1963, to ratify it.
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The British, however, were desperate to leave Southeast Asia as it was
very costly for the British to maintain Malaysia s security, especially in light of
sluggish British economy (Subritzky, 2000: 62). As a result, they kept insisting
the formation of the Malaysian Federation. On July 9, 1963, the Malaysia
Agreement was signed in London, which created  a  federation including
Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak (Jones, 2002: 165). Ironically,
Brunei was not included in the  federation due  to Brunei s insistence  on
maintaining control over Brunei's oil revenues in return for paying a mere
US$40 million to the Malaysian Federal treasury (Mackie, 1974: 142)
Sukarno was enraged by the London agreement but he still decided to
attend the Manila Summit, on July 30, 1963. More importantly for him was the
fact that Indonesia s proposal of having the United Nations Secretary General
ascertain publik opinion in Sabah and Sarawak through an inquiry  was
accepted (Jones, 1971: 280) Things apparently could be settled peacefully.
While the summit indeed ended in what the US Ambassador Howard
Jones saw as an Indonesian diplomatic triumph, as the ascertainment would be
held and completed by September 14, the British were not in a mood for
cooperation. On August 1, during the Manila Summit, the British Charge
d'Affaires called Tunku, insisting to both Tunku and the Australian Prime
Minister Mackenzie that August 31 was unalterable as the date for the
Malaysian Federation (Mackie, 1974: 158). The UN Secretary General U
Thant himself, who would be responsible for the inquiry, was not satisfied. He
believed that he was only given a short time and with the Tunku's
announcement that Malaysia would be proclaimed on September 16, he
complained that the British implied that they were going to set up Malaysia
regardless of the UN findings (Easter, 2004: 60, 2002: 188).
Therefore, when U Thant finally issued his findings on September 14
that "the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join
in the Federation of Malaysia," and added his mild criticisms towards the
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British conduct, (Mackie, 1974: 176) Indonesia was not in the mood to
acquiesce. On the morning of September 15, Howard Jones met an agitated
Sukarno who declared that he could not accept the result of the ascertainment
process, arguing that "certain procedures" were not carried out and accusing
the British of playing the game that the Dutch played in Irian Barat (Jones,
2002: 195) Sukarno in his memoir further declared:
Setting another arbitrary date two weeks later despite the fact that the
poll was not completed showed Britain's utter disregard of the outcome
of this puppet survey…. I was infuriated. The Indonesian government
had been tricked and  made to look like a dummy. The subsequent
demonstrations of enmity happened because of our bitter sense of
betrayal…. This highhanded announcement, made while the
ascertainment of the people's wishes was only in the opening stages, is
ludicrous. Britain never even awaited the outcome of the U.N.
assessment. I state that under the nose of the United Nations, internal
conditions in Brunei were cleverly juggled by the colonialists who had
considerable rubber, oil, and tin fortunes to lose. Indonesia has been
duped and humiliated in the eyes of the whole world. This affront to my
country is a personal hurt (Adams, 1965: 301).
Facing such insults, Sukarno became obsessed with humiliating and
destroying Malaysia, which lead to further incursions and acts of sabotage
committed by Indonesians in 1963-4. These actions made Malaysia to take the
matter into Security Council on September 1964, and the Security Council
passed a resolution against Indonesia that was vetoed by USSR.
This episode  further confirmed Sukarno's dissatisfaction with the
United  Nations, which he  believed as the agent of  the "Old Established
Forces," and he demanded the reformation of the UN. By 1965, his distaste
toward the new Federation of Malaysia and Britain was so great that when the
United Nations agreed to have Malaysia serve in the Security Council, Sukarno
abruptly decided to pull Indonesia out of the United Nations, to the surprise of
everyone including Indonesians themselves (Mackie, 1974: 283).
31
Jurnal Academia Praja Volume 1 Nomor 1 - Februari 2018
Testing the Three Hypothesis
In testing this case against the neorealist's hypothesis, the case of
Indonesia does not disprove neorealist's hypothesis that state will withdraw
from international organization when the international organization no longer
fit its interests. Indonesia had tried using the United Nations to advance its
interests by forcing  Malaysia to agree for a United Nations ascertainment
mission, although to its chagrin the result was not according to what Indonesia
expected. As Indonesia started to pursue  a  belligerent policy, the United
Nations was no longer seen as accommodative Indonesia's interests.
Furthermore, Indonesia saw that the admission of Malaysia as a member of
Security Council as an insult to Indonesia that signaled a global acceptance to
the formation of Malaysia, which Indonesia opposed. Since Indonesia found
the United Nations no longer useful to its interests, then it decided to withdraw.
However, since Indonesia was not a hegemonic state which withdrawal would
cause the international regimes to collapse, there was not a significant impact
on the United Nations itself.
The neoliberal/functionalists hypothesis was quite shaky in this case.
Indonesia's withdrawal was to the contrary of Neoliberal/functionalist
hypothesis that state would not withdraw from international regimes when it
benefits from the existence of international regimes. Indonesia's withdrawal
from the United Nations made it essentially a pariah in international relations.
Worse, Indonesia lost many benefits that it could gain by staying in the United
Nations such as United Nations' assistance programs to eradicate illiteracy and
various other technical assistances (Mackie, 1974: 283).
The second part of neoliberal/functionalist hypothesis that a state will
remain in international regime if it remains sharing common interests with the
regime was also disproved. If we look at the common interests of the state and
international organization functionally, such as the common interests of both
state and regime to eradicate illiteracy, then Indonesia's self-withdrawal from
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the United Nations was a self-defeating move that completely against its
interests. Therefore, neoliberal/functionalist hypothesis was unable to account
Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations.
The constructivist hypothesis looks at the identity of Indonesia, whether
Indonesia during that era of Konfrontasi shared a common identity with the
United Nations, and in that sense it was correct that Indonesia under Sukarno
no longer felt to share the same identity with the United Nations. By 1965,
Sukarno was convinced that the United Nations was simply unfixable and it
was  simply a tool  of the neocolonialists and imperialists  (Old  Established
Forces) to impose its order to the third world countries (the Newly Emerging
Forces). Since he no longer shared the same identity, then the only recourse left
for Sukarno was to take Indonesia out from the United Nations. As the result,
the constructivists' hypothesis is not disproved.
Having discussed these approaches, then it seems that both neorealism and
constructivism have the most plausible explanation toward why Indonesia
withdraw from the United Nations. However, the explanation remains
lacking, especially for neorealism, such as why the policy of "Konfrontasi"
never exploded to a full-blown war or why Indonesia did not pursue this
policy as vigorous as its previous adventure in West Irian. In addition, why
Indonesia withdrew in  1965, instead of in 1963 when the result of the
United Nations ascertainment mission did not satisfy Indonesia s interest.
Neorealist hypothesis was unable to answer this, as this decision was as a
result of domestic policy influence.
Neoclassical Realism: The Domestic Power Politics Model
Since we have observe that neorealist's hypothesis has some supports in
our case study, then we can take the hypothesis and work from the assumption
that state's decision to withdrawal from international regimes depends on
whether the international regimes can further its interests. The question is that
where the state s interest come from, and in this section will argue that the
interest come from the interplay between the domestic interest groups and the
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leader who has to do the balancing act in order to maintain his or her control
over the interest groups. This is the approach of neoclassical realism, which
stresses  the importance of domestic power politics  that  determines  foreign
policy choice that a state takes in facing the systemic constraints (Rose, 1998:
147).
In every state of the world, leaders have to have strong power base in
order to be able to remain in power. In democratic countries, election is the
common way for a leader to have a power base, so how strong the power base
of a leader is depended on how much vote those leaders get. In non-democratic
states however, the main sources of power are elite groups, and a leader who
want to remain on the top need to become good arbiter, where he or she
engages in balancing act in order to keep the power of elite groups equal in
strength and in check. Should the power of a group starts to get too strong, then
the leader must pursue a policy to put a check lest the interest group becomes
too powerful and can dictate its will toward the leader and thus threaten his or
her position. On the other hand, interest groups themselves have a balancing
mechanism where they essentially try to balance the other groups from getting
too strong and undercutting their influences in policy. Leader's main purpose is
to keep these groups from engaging in aggressive balancing that can lead to
conflict that could ultimately undercut the leader's power.
This behavior is translated to the foreign policy. Interest groups often
use foreign policy as a way to exert its influences and as a signal to its rivals
that it was in power. As the result, interest groups will compete to put its
foreign policy into table, yet they will also make sure that the policy that they
advocate do not put benefits other groups. On top of that, the leader is the main
determinant whether the interest group's policy will be used and the leader also
the one who determine how far he or she will pursue a foreign policy before he
or she starts to put the policy in check in order to limit the interest group's
influence.
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From these discussions then I put a combined hypothesis that national
interest is derived from the "struggle of dominance" between dominant interest
groups. Ultimately however, leaders are the ones who determine the extent to
which a group's policy will be taken, and leaders' choices are depended on
how far the leaders want to increase interest groups' power and influence in
order to balance against other interest groups. On the other hand, leaders
themselves are limited by political prestige, as any sign of weaknesses would
throw into question the leaders' capacity as the arbiter of power.
In testing this model, we have to look at the domestic power struggle in
Indonesia. After the formation of Guided Democracy, Sukarno, as the center of
power in Indonesian politics, was engaging in a balancing act between the two
most powerful political actors in Indonesian politics: the Army and PKI
(Indonesian Communist Party). His main concerns however lied on the former,
as the Army in 1962 had emerged as the most powerful actor due to two
factors: (1) the martial law that Sukarno imposed since  1959 when he
disbanded the parliament (Mackie, 1974: 82) and (2) the West Irian campaign
that was waged in 1961-2 that increased the military budget and its success
increased both Sukarno and military's prestige (Mackie, 1974: 99-101).
By the end of 1962 the West Irian campaign was essentially over, and
Indonesia could focus on another diplomatic problem: the idea of Malaysia that
was first advocated in 1961. In 1961, due to Indonesia's preoccupation with
West Irian, Indonesia's reaction to Malaysia was muted. By the end of 1962
however, things started to change due to several important factors: (1) the
visitation of North Kalimantan dissidents to Jakarta, whose cause was
immediately taken by Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), seeing this as an
opportunity to increase its prestige by stroking nationalistic and anti-
imperialistic fervor, (Mortimer, 1974: 204) (2) economic problems caused by
mounting inflation and budgetary crisis due to the high cost of West Irian
campaign that forced Indonesia to pursue stabilization, an unpopular belt-
tightening economic measure, and (3) once PKI's anti-imperialists criticism
started to gather steam and generate wide supports, it was necessary for
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Sukarno to finally address this issue (Mackie, 1974: 105). To further strengthen
Sukarno's decision to involve in anti-Malaysian policy, the Brunei Revolt
essentially caused Sukarno, who held grudges against Malaysia, to believe that
it was possible to achieve a quick foreign policy victory that would divert
publik's attention from the economic problem with no significant cost to
Indonesia.
Jumping into Sukarno's anti-Malaysia bandwagon was the army. As
discussed above, the Indonesian Communist Party was trying to increase its
prestige and it also want to halt Indonesia's turn to pro-Western foreign policy
orientation that was evident by Indonesia's acceptance on the economic
stabilization  program (Mortimer, 1974: 205). The army's main interests
however were quite complex. While the army feared a cutback in their budget
once the West Irian crisis  was  over, they were generally in favor for  the
economic stabilization scheme (Mackie, 1974: 132). Their fear, however, lied
on the fact that PKI's sudden seizure of the Malaysian issue would leave them
outflanked. In addition, the end of West Irian campaign could also mean that
Sukarno would soon lift the martial law that would undercut their political
power further (which he finally did in May 1963 that caused the military to
lose significant amount of  influence  in civil affairs) (Mackie, 1974: 134).
Facing these dilemmas, the military decided to support Sukarno's anti-
Malaysian campaign.
Once the nationalistic fervor was unleashed, none of these political
actors could withdraw lest they find their political power undercut. This was
especially true when the United Nations ascertainment mission was producing
unfavorable result from Indonesia and Malaysia's announcement by the end of
August that it would go ahead with the creation of the Malaysian Federation
regardless what the result from the ascertainment mission on September 16,
1963 that essentially means a slap on Sukarno's face (Mackie, 1974: 174). On
September 15, Indonesia refused to accept the UN report and decided to
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withhold the recognition of Malaysia, which resulted in Malaysia's decision to
severe  diplomatic relationship on September 17. On September 16, the
situation further escalated when Indonesian mob attacked the British embassy
in Jakarta, and the next day, Malayan mob burned Indonesian embassy in
Kuala Lumpur and Indonesian media reported that Malaysia's prime minister
was stamping Indonesia's national emblem that culminated in the burning of
the British embassy in Jakarta on September 18 followed by the destruction of
every British-owned house in Jakarta (Mackie, 1974: 187).
For all these mess happened in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, surprisingly
the actual military dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia remain limited to
border incursions. The reason was that both the army and PKI were unwilling
to push for open conflict. PKI feared that the increase in  intensity of the
Malaysian campaign would mean re-imposition of martial law that would
benefit the army (Mackie, 1974:242). The army  however simply  did not
believe that the campaign would be successful and they simply would not risk
a British counterattack that would essentially demoralize the army (Mackie,
1974: 263). Sukarno on the other hand was trying to end the conflict using
combination of both threats and compromises toward Malaysia in 1963-5. Yet
Malaysia and the British simply refused to provide him a face-saving exit that
forced him to embroil further into the Konfrontasi (Legge, 1984: 37).
International events also worked against him, such as Indonesia's defeat in the
Security Council that was discussed above. Finally, Malaysia's admittance as a
member of Security Council in 1965 was simply too much insult for Sukarno
to bear and he decided to withdraw from the United Nations.
From this second case then we can see that the domestic balancing was
a very important factor in determining the conduct of foreign policy. PKI and
the army's political struggles essentially limited Konfrontasi from becoming a
full-blown war. On the other hand, Sukarno as a leader was in bind, as his
involvement in Malaysia was the product of domestic struggle, yet to extricate
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himself from this conflict that started to get out of his control was simply
impossible due to the amount of political capital involved and not to mention
that his withdrawal from the conflict would mean the acceptance of defeat and
brought his capacity of the arbiter of power into question. He was seeking a
face-saving formula, which was denied from him by both the British and the
Malaysian, that lead to further intensification of the conflict.
Conclusion
In trying to make sense about Indonesia's withdrawal from the United
Nations, the neo-classical realist model has the best explanatory ability.
Domestic political struggle influences the conduct of foreign policy of a state.
Indonesia's  decision  to withdraw from  the United  Nations  was  basically a
combination of both international and domestic factors: internationally, the
United Nations was seen as no longer conductive toward national interests,
while domestically, Indonesia's domestic pressure in 1964-5 was too strong to
be ignored by the decision-makers.
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